Up to 70 have been killed in fighting between forces of Syria's transitional government and apparent loyalists of ousted dictator Bashar Assad. The clashes began March 6 when 15 members of the new government's security forces were killed in ambushes near the town of Jableh in the coastal province of Latakia [25], heartland of the Alawite minority and stronghold of support for the old regime. (Al Jazeera [26], BBC News [27]) The transition government had been mobilizing troops to the region since two members of the security forcres were killed in a similar ambush in Latakia's Daatur district two days earlier. (AFP [28])
It is unclear if the Latakia fighting is linked to the "Syrian Popular Resistance," which declared its existence in a statement Dec. 29, pledging to attack figures affiliated with (the now ostensibly dissolved) Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS [29]), the leading faction in the forces that took power and formed the transition government in December, purportedly in response to the killing of Shi'ites and Christians since the overthrow of the Assad regime. The statement labeled the HTS-led coalition "Kharijites [30]," implying that they are heretical. (ISW [31])
Despite its "secular" veneer, the Assad regime cultivated a support base among followers the Alawite sect of Shia Islam, while the majority Sunnis chiefly supported the opposition, allowing sectarians on both sides to exploit the conflict. (There were, of course some Alawites who broke with [32] the regime.)
The UN human rights office has indeed made note of some cases of apparent reprisal killings of Alawites since the fall of Assad, although it is unclear whether they were targeted for their sectarian affiliation or for being Assad collaborators. It is also unclear who the perpetrators are, and reprisal attacks have been condemned and disavowed by the transition government. (UN News [33])
Nonetheless, the usually very reliable Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR [34]) said March 7 that at least 162 civilians had been killed in "field executions" in the context of the new fighting in Latakia. The following day, SOHR said the total number of such summary executions of Alawite civilians had reached 340. The new government is said to have opened a dialogue with Alawite leaders in Damascus to try to de-escalate the situation. (BBC News [35], Rudaw [36], PRI [37])
Israeli land-grab, air-strikes
On Feb. 25, Israel, which has established a "security zone [38]" in Syria's south, carried out air-strikes on military sites in Kiswah, south of Damascus, and in Daraa province. The strikes came two days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded the "demilitarization" of southern Syria. In announcing the strikes, Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israel "will not allow southern Syria to become southern Lebanon." He warned: "Any attempt by the Syrian regime forces and the country's terrorist organizations to establish themselves in the security zone in southern Syria will be met with fire." (EA Worldview [39])
Kurdish conflict unresolved; Turkish air-strikes
Fighting meanwhile continues in north and eastern Syria between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA [22]) and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF [23]). As SDF fighters continue to block the SNA advance on the frontline town of Manbij [40], Turkish warplanes reportedly carried out air-strikes this week on civilian targets around Kobani [41], in the heart of the Kurdish autonomous territory [22] of Rojava. (SDF Press Office [42], BBC News [43])
Convergence threat, conspiracy theories
Unfortunately, there are fears of a convergence between the conflicts in Syria's south and northeast. SDF commander Gen. Mazloum Abdi [44] reportedly told a BBC journalist March 5 that if Israel can "prevent attacks against us and stop the killing of our people, we welcome that and appreciate it." He added: "We welcome anyone in the world who can help support our rights and protect our achievements... We welcome support from anyone."
These statements followed BBC journalist Jiyar Gol's comments that "there are reports of contact between Rojava and Israel," and that "Israel's Foreign Minister has repeatedly asked for support for the Kurds in Syria." (Jerusalem Post [45])
This will certainly play into the endless conspiracy theories [46] in Turkish nationalist circles that the Kurds are the pawns of a Zionist conspiracy against Turkey and the Muslim world.
The Iran factor
Yet, ironically, the Kurds are also accused of receiving support from Israel's bitter regional enemy, Iran. The foreign ministries of Turkey and Iran have each summoned their respective envoys for remonstrance after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan implied that Tehran is backing the SDF—and seemed to threaten to back rebel groups in Iran in retaliation!
In an interview with Al Jazeera Arabic on Feb. 26, Fidan addressed Iran, saying [47]: "If you try to create unrest in another country by supporting a group there, another country might support a group in your country to create unrest for you. Nothing can remain hidden in today's world. The capabilities you have, others also possess. Therefore, if you do not want stones thrown at your window, you should not throw stones at others' windows." (Middle East Eye [48])
This implied threat may be a reference to Iran's Azeri ethnic minority, who are closely related to the Turks, and have been facing a harsh crackdown [49] in the Islamic Republic following a wave of protests.
The extensive Iran-backed militia forces [50] in Syria were propping up Bashar Assad, and their status since the fall of his regime is uncertain. The SNA attacks on Rojava over the past years did drive the SDF into a paradoxical tactical alliance [22] with the Assad dictatorship—despite their fundamental disagreement on the question of Kurdish autonomy. The militantly secular and feminist SDF are obviously at even greater odds with Iran's woman-oppressing [51], clerical-reactionary regime.
In fact, the SDF is informally allied and ideologically linked with a Kurdish rebel group within Iran, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK [52]). We may assume that if Ankara decides to make trouble for Iran by backing a rebel group within its territory, it won't be them.
The SDF have also, of course, been heavily backed by the US Pentagon [53] to fight ISIS, which would make any such tactical alliance between them and Tehran ironic in the extreme. These operations continue even now, with the US Central Command announcing March 8 that it had assisted in an SDF raid that broke up an "ISIS cell" in al-Shuhayl, in eastern Deir ez-Zor province. (Rudaw [54])
The PKK factor
Another factor that may impact the situation is the recent call [55] by Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned head of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK [55]), for the Kurdish revolutionary movement in Turkey to negotiate a ceasefire and lay down arms. The Rojava leadership is within the ideological orbit of Öcalan and the PKK, and a ceasefire in Turkey could provide greater impetus for the SDF to reach accommodations with the new government in Syria—despite obvious obstacles.
Toward a new constitution: unanswered questions
Syria's new leadership held a two-day national dialogue conference Feb. 24-5, which authorities hailed as the first step towards drafting a constitution [56] and rebuilding the country [57]. The Damascus meeting was presided over by transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa [58], formerly head of HTS, when he was known by the nom de guerre Jolani [59].
But critics protested that the 600-delegate conference did not include any Kurdish officials [60] from the Rojava region. It was also unclear what influence the conference's non-binding recommendations [61] would have on the new government. (TNH [62], Al Jazeera [63])
According to the state news agency SANA (now controlled by the interim government), the conference issued several resolutions, including for the formation of a legislative council, and a commitment to human rights, "transitional justice," and a guarantee of freedom of expression.
However, no further details were provided, leaving key questions about the new constitution unanswered.
Al Jazeera Arabic reported that the declaration of constitutional principles included a stipulation that Syria's president must be a Muslim. This will not be welcomed by the militantly secular Rojava Kurds. And there was no word on a question of critical importance to the Kurdish leadership: whether the new Syria is to be centralist or federalist, allowing for survival of the Rojava autonomous zone. (The New Arab [64])
The Druze factor
The transition government also appears to face a challenge in another restive and traditionally excluded minority—the Druze, in the southern province of Suweida. Protests by local Druze were reported in Suweida city March 6, apparently led by the local Military Council that took up arms [29] against the Assad regime in its final days. However, there were also reports of internecine fighting between the Military Council and the Men of Dignity [65], another Druze formation that opposed the Assad regime and appears to now support the transitional government. (Syrian Observer [66])
The Russia factor
Amid all this, Russia, which had massively backed the Assad dictatorship, is now said to be in talks with the new authorities in a bid to retain its military bases in Syria—principally the airfield at Hmeimim [25] in Latakia, and the naval base at Tartus [50], in the province of that name just to the south. Surprisingly, it appears that these bases have not yet been evacuated. Reports indicate that when Russian convoys venture out from these bases, they receive an escort from the security forces of the new government. (Syrian Observer [67], Reuters [68])
