The Iran Strikes and the Rule of Law
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by Mohamed Arafa, JURIST
The most striking aspect of the Trump administration’s legal argument for the attack on Iran is that, in practical terms, it simply does not exist. When President Donald Trump announced that the United States was "at war," he claimed the strikes were intended to eliminate "imminent threats from the Iranian regime," yet offered no evidence to support that assertion. The historical incidents he cited—the 1979-1981 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, the 1983 bombing of US Marine barracks in Lebanon, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole—occurred decades ago. Trump even suggested that Iran’s leaders "knew [about] and were probably involved" in these events, while emphasizing that the US had "completely and totally obliterated the regime's nuclear program" last year. Beyond these historical episodes, the administration presented no proof of any current, imminent threat from Iran. Under international law, imminence requires a threat that is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative means of response—a standard plainly not met here. Particularly alarming is the explicit targeting of foreign leaders. The killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came less than two months after US forces attempted to seize Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, signaling a troubling expansion of precedent for US interventions abroad. Deliberately targeting heads of state is prohibited under international law and the New York Convention, to protect political stability and to avoid escalating conflicts unnecessarily.
Domestically, these strikes violate multiple legal principles. The US Constitution explicitly grants Congress—not the president—the power to declare war. While Article II allows some presidential authority to respond to direct attacks on US territory or against its armed forces, no such attack occurred from Iran. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 further restricts presidential military action to cases involving (1) a declaration of war, (2) explicit congressional authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on US forces. Trump did not argue that any of these conditions applied, effectively bypassing the constitutional checks intended to prevent unilateral executive war-making. Even in comparison with prior presidents, this approach is exceptional. Historically, US presidents have occasionally acted abroad without full legal authority, but Congress has never pursued impeachment solely on these grounds. Trump’s defenders now lean on historical precedent, claiming prior administrations acted similarly; yet in every instance, some form of domestic or international legal rationale existed, unlike the speculative preemptive rationale offered here.
Internationally, the strikes violate foundational norms. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state except when authorized by the Security Council or undertaken in legitimate self-defense. No Security Council authorization was obtained. UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the strikes as violations of the Charter. Targeting Khamenei and other Iranian leaders contravenes long-standing international prohibitions against political assassinations. Even under US law, successive executive orders ban political assassinations—though past presidents have sometimes found ways to skirt these rules, they remain a clear benchmark of legality. The joint US-Israeli strikes—dubbed operations "Shield of Judah" and "Epic Fury," respectively—further violated international norms. They came amid ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations in Geneva—only two days after the most intensive round had concluded. Israel described the strikes as "preventive," aimed at stopping Iran from developing a potential threat. Yet preventive war has little basis under international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter explicitly prohibits force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. The narrow conditions for anticipatory self-defense under the Caroline Doctrine—threats that are instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means—were clearly absent on February 28, 2026.
The strikes have been explicitly framed as regime change. Trump encouraged Iranians to "take over your government," while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the goal as removing the "existential threat" of the Iranian regime. Forcible regime change violates the foundational principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention under international law. The deliberate targeting of Iran's leadership, combined with attacks on military infrastructure, risks creating a power vacuum and exacerbating human suffering. Reports of airstrikes on a school in Minab, killing at least 100 girls aged seven to twelve, underscore the humanitarian consequences of unplanned regime change. Unlike in the cases of Libya under Muammar Qaddafi or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, no semblance of a post-conflict stabilization plan exists for Iran, heightening the likelihood of chaos and prolonged violence.
Diplomatically, the strikes are equally concerning. Launching military operations during active negotiations violates the principle of good faith in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter. Iranian officials have denounced the attacks as a violation of international law. The global response has been revealing: while Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese tacitly supported the strikes, and France, Germany, and the UK offered noncommittal statements urging negotiation, Russia and China openly condemned the attacks. The erosion of the rules-based international order is therefore accelerating.
From a humanitarian perspective, justifications for intervention fail under scrutiny. Some have cited Kosovo in 1999, where NATO intervened to halt human rights abuses. While the NATO campaign was ultimately judged illegal, it was considered morally legitimate because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted, and the operation effectively protected civilians. In contrast, a nuclear deal with Iran was reportedly within reach just hours before Trump launched the strikes, mediated by Oman's Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi. Diplomatic channels were still viable, and the US had not demanded an end to human rights violations as part of ongoing negotiations.
Claims of an imminent nuclear threat are demonstrably false. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by President Barack Obama had already curtailed Iran’s nuclear program, US intelligence suggested it would take years for Iran to build a weapon, and prior US-Israeli strikes had delayed progress. Even if these claims were accurate, international law requires immediacy for anticipatory self-defense, which was absent. Broadening preemptive war to include potential future threats risks destabilizing global norms, a warning illustrated by Vladimir Putin's repeated pretextual justifications for aggression in Ukraine.
The 9-11 attacks fundamentally reshaped US legal and military frameworks. On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people were killed in coordinated terrorist attacks, prompting Congress to pass the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) on September 18, 2001. This law granted President George W. Bush broad authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against those responsible or harboring perpetrators. The AUMF provided a clear legal foundation for US military action abroad, grounded in a direct attack on the nation, and remains a cornerstone of US counterterrorism law. By contrast, Trump’s Iran strikes had no comparable legal trigger. No attack on US forces had occurred, and Congress was not consulted. Invoking the 2001 AUMF to justify unilateral strikes against Iran would dangerously expand its reach, undermining constitutional checks and setting a precedent for unbounded presidential war-making. The Iraq War that began in 2003 further illuminates the contrast. President Bush sought and received specific Congressional authorization, despite the controversy over intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction. Although the intelligence was later discredited, the existence of formal authorization distinguished the Iraq War from a purely unilateral executive action. Trump sought no equivalent legal pathway for his war on Iran. While the 2001 AUMF responded directly to a national catastrophe, Trump's justification relied on speculative threats and ambitions for regime change.
Beyond domestic law, 9-11 shaped US interpretations of pre-emptive self-defense under international law. The Bush administration argued that action against al-Qaeda and affiliates was justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter. That principle, however, is limited to actual or imminent armed attacks. Preemptive action against Iraq or Iran, where no imminent attack occurred, stretches this principle to its breaking point. The immediacy criterion—the essence of legitimate anticipatory self-defense—was not met in Trump's Iran strikes, as intelligence reports indicated Iran remained years from building a nuclear weapon. The political legitimacy granted after 9-11 also matters. Post-9-11, Congress and the public broadly supported decisive action because a tangible attack had occurred. Trump's unilateral strikes, by contrast, lack a comparable factual basis, relying on speculative threats and regime change ambitions, making them legally and politically precarious. Historical precedent illustrates that excessive executive war-making without clear authorization can produce long-term instability and weaken both domestic and international norms.
The strikes' human toll has been stark. Beyond the deaths of Khamenei and other leaders, civilian casualties—including reports of over 100 children killed in Minab—highlight the immediate consequences even of ostensibly regime-targeted strikes. Without a coherent post-conflict stabilization plan, the region faces risks of chaos, insurgency, and humanitarian catastrophe, echoing Libya post-Qaddafi and Iraq post-Saddam.
Globally, these strikes signify a dangerous erosion of the rules-based international order. When powerful states act unilaterally, weaponizing claims of prevention or humanitarian need, they undermine UN norms, weaken collective security mechanisms, and encourage other states to adopt similar pretextual reasoning. The resulting instability threatens not only Iran but broader regional and global security. The joint military offensive against Iran has triggered a sharp escalation in Middle East tensions, drawing in multiple countries and military assets across the region. In parallel, Israel has also intensified strikes against Hezbollah militia positions in Lebanon, widening the geographic scope of the confrontation. In response to those strikes, Iran has launched waves of ballistic missiles and armed drones targeting US-linked military bases and installations (including embassies and consulates) in Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and others that host American forces, marking one of the most direct attacks on US assets in decades. These exchanges have disrupted key infrastructure, closed shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz, caused civilian as well as military casualties, and raised fears among Gulf Cooperation Council states about becoming battlegrounds in a broader conflict. The cycle of strikes and counter-strikes— encompassing both conventional and asymmetric tactics—has heightened instability across the Persian Gulf, pushed energy markets into volatility, and prompted urgent calls from international actors for de-escalation to prevent a wider regional war.
The consequences of these strikes will not be contained to the present moment. Iran's future is likely to be shaped by multiple, overlapping pressures—political, military, and economic—as a result of the ongoing conflict with the US and Israel. The assassination of key leaders and sustained military pressure could fuel internal political instability, prompting debates within the government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over how to respond, and potentially strengthening hardline factions. At the same time, discussions about possible regime change remain highly uncertain. While mounting economic strain, public dissatisfaction, and elite fragmentation could generate internal pressure for transformation, external military attacks often consolidate nationalist support around existing authorities rather than weaken them. Moreover, Iran’s security institutions are structured to preserve regime continuity, making sudden collapse unlikely without significant internal fractures among political, military, and clerical elites. Analysts and scholars also warn that attacks on nuclear and military infrastructure could reinforce Tehran's determination to pursue nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, particularly if diplomatic channels deteriorate further. Meanwhile, the already fragile economy—burdened by recession, inflation, sanctions, and social discontent—may deteriorate further, increasing public hardship and the risk of unrest. Regionally, continued confrontation could intensify proxy conflicts and deepen polarization across the Middle East. Taken together, these dynamics point to a future marked less by clear transformation than by prolonged uncertainty, volatility, and strategic recalibration, with significant implications for both Iran’s domestic trajectory and broader regional stability.
The Trump administration's strikes on Iran constitute violations of both US domestic law and international law. Congress was bypassed, the War Powers Resolution ignored, UN mandates flouted, and established prohibitions against targeting heads of state and engaging in preventive war disregarded. Historical precedents—9-11, the Iraq War, and the AUMF—highlight how legal frameworks were previously employed to justify military action; none were present in this instance. The human, regional, and geopolitical costs are immense. Ultimately, the law exists not merely as formalism but as a check on executive overreach and a safeguard for human life and international stability. The Trump administration’s actions demonstrate the dangers of ignoring these safeguards. If unchallenged, they set a precedent for future unilateral interventions with profound legal, moral, and geopolitical consequences. Trump told the New York Times in January that he is driven by his own morality. "I don't need international law. I'm not looking to hurt people," the US president said at that time. The stakes could not be higher, and the erosion of the rule of law—domestic and international—has already begun.
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Mohamed Arafa is a professor of law at Egypt'sn Alexandria University Faculty of Law.
This piece first appeared March 6 in JURIST [3]. Used with permission.
Photo: Tomahawk missile launched from destroyer USS Spruance during Operation Epic Fury
Credit: NAVCENT Public Affairs via Wikimedia Commons [4]
From our Daily Report:
US Congress rejects war powers resolution on Iran
CounterVortex [5], March 6, 2026
UN demands civilian protection amid Middle East escalation
CounterVortex [6], March 5, 2026
Did US-Israel attack on Iran abort nuclear deal?
CounterVortex [7], March 1, 2026
See also:
THE TRAGEDY OF AHWAZ
Forgotten by History and the World
by Rahim Hamid, Dur Untash Studies Centre
CounterVortex [8], September 2021
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Reprinted by CounterVortex, March 7, 2026
Used with permission.
